Category: Crow

“I make no bones about the content, it is exactly what it is meant to be, but I did make an error in its release, in that the damn Pilot MUST Always be FREE, that is entirely my bad and it is bad for exposure frankly as it buckles momentum.

Fortunately I am well into the next two entries of his dark cycle and should have more soon, once those release I will unleash him upon the masses.”

AVAILABLE TO PATRONS

The root of the word Vandyrian is vanguard, but not in the political, artistic, or military sense that term later acquired. The origin is older, stranger, and far less intentional. It comes from mishearing, from damaged media, from analogue decay, and from the particular way myth enters the mind before language hardens into definitions.

In the early 1990s, tape was still dominant. VHS and cassette audio carried with them a property that digital media has largely erased: failure was audible. Stretch, warble, dropout, pitch drift, stutter. Meaning could fracture in motion. A line could arrive malformed, elongated, or half-consumed by noise, and the listener would not automatically assume error. They would assume mystery.

Crow, then roughly Six years old, encountered such a fracture while watching a film that sampled the original 1930s Orson Welles War of the Worlds broadcast. The line is famous and well-documented:

“…the strange beings who landed in the Jersey farmlands tonight are the vanguard of an invading army from the planet Mars.”

But tape does not respect documentation. A stretch artifact distorted the phrase mid-playback, fragmenting syllables, elongating consonants, smearing cadence. What arrived was not “vanguard.” What arrived sounded like something else entirely. Something closer to a proper noun. Something alien. Not the vanguard of an invading army.

This was not registered as an error. There was no internet to correct it, no wiki to consult, no instant replay culture trained to flatten anomaly.

What existed instead was a child’s assumption that he had simply heard the name of a thing he did not yet understand.

If there were Martians, then perhaps Vandyrians were what they were called. Or perhaps they were something older still—something ahead of Mars, beyond it, preceding it. The joke about Martian origin was never entirely a joke.

This matters because this is how myth actually forms. Not through committee. Not through branding. Not through deliberate worldbuilding exercises. It forms through misalignment—between signal and receiver, between expectation and artifact. A damaged transmission creates a gap, and the imagination fills it with structure. A word is born not as definition but as gravity.

“Vandyrian” did not originate as a concept. It originated as a question: what are those? And more importantly, where did they come from? In the pre-internet age, unanswered questions could live for years. They could accrete meaning. They could mature without being corrected out of existence.

This is why Vandyrian functions the way it does. It does not feel like a coined term because it was not coined in the conventional sense. It was misheard, misremembered, and left to ferment. Its phonetics carry the residue of analogue distortion. Its cadence feels slightly off, slightly foreign, because it is. And so the name endured. Not because it was chosen, but because it remained. Misheard, uncorrected, carried forward intact through silence, absence, and time.

The Vandyrians were never meant to be defined at the moment of their arrival. They were meant to be encountered later—through ruins, through echoes, through the arguments of those who came after. That is how civilizations enter myth. Not cleanly spoken into being, but recovered. This is the tale of a Vandyrian civilization.

It would seem that—through a process of deliberate legal framing and creative codification—Crow has independently rediscovered and formalized an idea that has long existed only in fragments, half-remembered and rarely defended in the modern era. This was not an act of imitation, nor a conscious revival of any single historical model, but rather the convergence of long-standing mythic instincts with a contemporary understanding of how ownership, authorship, and enclosure operate in late-stage creative economies. What emerged was not a permissive license in the conventional sense, but a declaration of category: a refusal to treat a fictional corpus as intellectual property at all, and a decision instead to reclassify it as mythology while the creator still lived, published, and retained full awareness of what that choice entailed.

What Crow has done is closest to a myth commons—distinct from open-source software, and equally distinct from Creative Commons licensing. Open-source software, for all its virtues, remains utilitarian and functional at its core. It presumes an optimization problem, a technical goal, and a culture of contribution governed by versioning, maintainership, and compatibility. Creative Commons, meanwhile, remains rooted in copyright logic even as it relaxes it; it presumes an owner who grants permissions, an author whose name must often persist as an organizing axis, and a legal framework designed to manage reuse rather than dissolve authority. The myth commons operates on a different axis entirely. It does not ask how a work may be reused; it asks whether the work should be ownable in the first place.

Historically, mythology functioned precisely because no one was in a position to defend it. Myths survived by being retold incorrectly, localized irresponsibly, commercialized shamelessly, and contradicted constantly. The strength of a myth was never its internal consistency but its resilience under distortion. What is unusual in the modern moment is not that someone would want their work to function this way, but that someone would choose to formalize that outcome in advance, rather than allowing it to happen through neglect, obscurity, or posthumous loss of control. OML-97 does not abandon authorship accidentally; it relinquishes authority intentionally.

This is the critical distinction. Most contemporary “shared universe” efforts fail not because they are too open, but because they are not open enough. They retain soft canons, stewardship committees, tone enforcement, attribution policing, or commercial choke points that reassert hierarchy even while gesturing toward collaboration. The result is not myth, but bureaucracy wearing myth’s skin. By contrast, the OML-97 framework removes nearly all of the mechanisms by which a creator might later intervene. It permits contradiction. It permits misuse. It permits profit without tribute. And most importantly, it forbids enclosure—not through moral appeal, but through structural denial. No derivative may close what was opened, because doing so would reintroduce the very category the license rejects.

From an observational standpoint, this places Crow in a role far older than modern authorship but largely incompatible with modern creative markets: that of the first teller rather than the proprietor. The first teller does not vanish; their version remains available, often foundational, sometimes dominant. But it is no longer definitive. Authority migrates outward into use, repetition, and mutation. Over time, the myth’s center of gravity shifts away from origin and toward utility—toward what survives being useful to other minds, other tables, other eras. This is not an abdication of craft. It is a wager on endurance.

There is also a subtle but important inversion at work. In most licensing schemes, the creator asks, implicitly or explicitly, to be remembered. Attribution clauses, brand continuity, canonical primacy—these are all attempts to secure legacy through control. The myth commons secures legacy through dispossession. It assumes that what is worth keeping will be kept without being ordered to remain intact. In this sense, OML-97 is less a license than a test: if the myth cannot survive freedom, it did not deserve permanence.

From within the Vaultus perspective, this move reads less as radical generosity and more as structural realism. Empires fall. Archives fracture. Names blur. What remains are frameworks that can be repurposed under new pressures. By declaring the mythos indestructible through openness, Crow sidesteps the usual failure modes of fictional worlds: corporate capture, legal stagnation, or cultural irrelevance. The work is no longer protected by law; it is protected by dispersal. It cannot be deleted because it cannot be recalled. It cannot be monopolized because it has no center.

In that sense, the rediscovery is not romantic but pragmatic. Myth is the only narrative technology that has demonstrably survived thousands of years without maintenance. OML-97 is simply an attempt to remember that fact early, and to act accordingly.